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Abstract  
Under the Chinese legal system, in principle, there is no objection to dynamic and personalized pricing of enterprises. 
Dynamic pricing does not involve the processing of personal information, and consumers have a higher perception of 
price fairness, it is seldom concerned by laws and policies. Personalized pricing involves the processing of personal 
information, and consumers generally feel that the price is unfair and difficult to accept, so it is the focus of legal 
regulation. Enterprises face three obstacles in implementing personalized pricing. First, in terms of personal information 
protection, enterprises should abide by the provisions on personal consent and automatic decision-making in the 
Personal Information Protection Law. Second, in the aspect of anti-monopoly, enterprises should abide by the provisions 
of the Anti-Monopoly Law, and cannot achieve collusion through algorithms and abuse market dominance to implement 
differential treatment for trading counterparts. Third, in the protection of consumers' rights and interests, enterprises 
should respect the Price Law and other laws, and cannot commit price fraud and price discrimination. The current law 
on dynamic and personalized pricing is not perfect. In the future, we can protect consumers' rights and interests mainly 
by strengthening enterprises' obligation of providing information. 
Keywords: dynamic pricing, personalized pricing, price discrimination, price fraud 
1 Introduction 
The COVID-19 epidemic has brought great impact to the global economy, and the world economic situation has 
become extremely complicated and severe, and the economies of all countries are facing the greatest uncertainty. In this 
context, in order to promote economic stability and rapid development, China strives to promote the integration of 
digital economy and real economy, and strives to create new advantages of digital economy. In March 2020, the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council issued the "Opinions on Building a Better System 
and Mechanism of Market-oriented Allocation of Factors", which brought data into the scope of production factors for 
the first time and proposed to speed up the cultivation of data factor market. On June 29th, 2021, Shenzhen, as a pilot 
area of data legislation, also passed the Data Regulations of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, which explored and 
cultivated the data factor market from five aspects and established the relevant system of fair competition in data. 
According to the White Paper on China's Digital Economy Development published by China Academy of Information 
and Communications Technology(CAICT) in 2021, the scale of China's digital economy in 2020 has reached 39.2 
trillion yuan, accounting for nearly 40% of GDP, and its growth rate is more than three times that of GDP. Digital 
economy has become the key power to stabilize China's economic growth. 
In the era of digital economy, data is the core factor of production, basic and strategic resource, and also an important 
productive force.Digitalization provides more opportunities and possibilities for the development of enterprises, and 
also brings more challenges, one of which is the pricing of enterprises. Digitalization can make it easier and cheaper for 
enterprises to collect various data. By using the collected data, enterprises can make the prices of their products or 
services respond to any changes in market conditions in a timely manner, and even make individual adjustments in real 
time according to consumers' different willingness to pay. Therefore, the price of products or services in the digital 
economy will change more frequently than ever before, and the price will become more dynamic and personalized. 
The pricing freedom of enterprises is a basic component of the free economic order, and an effective pricing strategy is 
the key to increase demand, sales and profits. However, the rapidly changing prices, especially those customized for 
consumers, make consumers feel that prices are unfair. In recent years, more and more consumers and media have 
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criticized enterprises for implementing dynamic and personalized pricing, and the Chinese government has promulgated 
a large number of laws to regulate the pricing behavior of enterprises. However, among the dynamic and personalized 
pricing implemented by enterprises, there is no consensus on which are legal pricing behaviors and which are illegal 
pricing behaviors. There are also great controversies in the specific application of the relevant laws regulating enterprise 
pricing. This greatly restricts enterprises from implementing dynamic and personalized pricing on a large scale, which is 
not conducive to providing Chinese enterprises with competitiveness in the digital economy. The purpose of this paper 
is to clarify the differences between dynamic pricing and personalized pricing by using economic and legal theories and 
methods, and to find out the legal obstacles for enterprises to implement dynamic and personalized pricing under the 
Chinese legal system, so as to provide guidance for the government and enterprises to better regulate and implement 
dynamic and personalized pricing. 
2. Definition of Dynamic and Personalized Pricing 
2.1 Dynamic Pricing 
Dynamic pricing does not have a clear and universally acceptable definition for the general public, and is mostly 
defined from an economic perspective. Some define it, for example, as a strategy in which prices change over time, with 
consumers and/or with the environment (Haws & Bearden，2016).Some define it as a planned unilateral change in a 
supplier's pricing criteria at any point in the sales process to respond to changing demand or competitive environments 
in order to maximize profits (Gnsch et al., 2009).Others define it as an essentially identical product with different prices 
depending on observable environmental conditions, whereby the price can change over time for all buyers and between 
buyers at the same point in time (Spann & Skiera，2020). Dynamic pricing is a pricing strategy for companies. Unlike 
fixed prices, where prices remain the same even if demand increases, dynamic pricing is a reflection of the principles of 
supply and demand in the market economy. By constantly adjusting prices, firms are able to respond to fluctuations in 
demand in order to achieve increased sales and maximize profits. Therefore, this paper defines dynamic pricing as a 
pricing strategy in which a firm adjusts the price of a good or service at any time in order to maximize profits, based on 
changes in current market demand, the competitive environment, and other factors. This definition is a narrow dynamic 
pricing, i.e., dynamic pricing without individual differentiation, where all consumers pay the same price at the same 
point in time. Dynamic pricing in a broad sense also includes dynamic pricing with individual differentiation, i.e., 
personalized dynamic pricing, or personalized pricing, where different consumers pay different prices at the same point 
in time. 
While dynamic pricing is as old as commerce itself, the sale of goods or services at fixed, non-negotiated prices is a 
relatively new "invention" in human history. The French entrepreneur Aristide Boucicaut is said to have been one of the 
first to set fixed prices for goods, introducing them in his department store "Le Bon Marché" during the Paris World's 
Fair in 1855, which avoided time-consuming bargaining for each product (Fezer & Obergfell., 2016).The price in a 
fixed price is not fixed either, the price is only fixed for a certain period of time and the price is adjusted less often. 
Before Aristide Boucicaut, fixed prices were not common, and the price of a good or service was determined by the 
buyer and seller individually. Nowadays, with the rapid development of digitalization and related technologies, the price 
of goods or services has returned from fixed prices to dynamic pricing. Today's dynamic pricing prices are adjusted 
more frequently, and prices can change daily, hourly, or even secondly. 
2.2 Personalized Pricing 
As with dynamic pricing, there is no universally accepted definition of personalized pricing.The UK Office of Fair 
Trading (OFT) defines personalized pricing as a firm's use of observed, voluntarily provided, inferred or collected 
information about an individual's behavior or characteristics to set different prices for different consumers (whether 
individuals or groups) that the firm believes they are willing to pay (2013).The Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) defines personalized pricing as the practice of price discrimination against end consumers 
based on their individual characteristics and behaviors, resulting in prices being set as an incremental function of 
consumers' willingness to pay (2018).The European Commission defines online personalized pricing, which refers to 
the use of data collected from individuals' online activities, including their web browsing behavior, to customize the 
prices of goods and services for users (2018).In this paper, personalized pricing is defined as the use of data collected 
from different consumers with personal characteristics or behaviors, etc., to offer different prices to different customers 
for the same goods or services at the same time. 
Personalized pricing is price discrimination, which is often used in practice as a substitute for individualized pricing. 
Price discrimination is when a manufacturer sets different prices, including discounts, for different consumers for the 
same product or service based on the consumer's characteristics, time or place of purchase, amount of purchase, or other 
relevant information (Badmaeva & Hüllmann, 2019).There are three forms of price discrimination. First-degree price 
discrimination, also known as full price discrimination, is when a firm demands a price according to each consumer's 
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different willingness to pay (the highest price the consumer is willing to pay) and the firm gets the entire consumer 
surplus (the amount of money the consumer is willing to pay minus the amount of money he actually pays). First-degree 
price discrimination is impossible to achieve, the firm cannot know the willingness to pay of each consumer, and the 
consumer will not show his willingness to pay to the firm. Second-degree price discrimination is when a firm sells 
different units of a product at different prices, but each person who buys the same quantity pays the same price. 
Second-degree price discrimination usually includes consumer self-selection of quantity or quality, such as giving 
discounts to consumers who buy more quantity, and setting airline tickets as first-class or economy class tickets to be 
chosen by consumers. Third-degree price discrimination refers to firms granting different prices to different groups of 
consumers. Third-degree price discrimination is the most common form of price discrimination, such as giving 
discounts to students or elderly people, and giving low prices to locals in scenic spots. 
When firms have limited access to data, they can only implement third-degree price discrimination, i.e., price 
discrimination for specific groups of consumers. As consumers are described in sufficient detail and market segments 
continue to be refined, firms can segment consumers' willingness to pay section by section, with the result that 
individualized prices are offered to customers. Thus, personalized pricing is a relatively refined form of price 
discrimination, which is essentially segmentation based on three levels of price discrimination, with the ultimate goal of 
achieving one level of price discrimination. In personalized pricing, group prices play a greater role. 
2.3 Distinguish the Meaning 
Dynamic pricing and personalized pricing are often applied as synonyms, but they do not have the same meaning and it 
is important to distinguish between them. Dynamic pricing takes into account only the aggregate preferences of 
consumers, and consumers' individual willingness to pay is not taken into account, while personalized pricing is formed 
on the basis of consumer-specific criteria in the context of the different willingness to pay of the target group, allowing 
firms to achieve a more precise predation on consumers. Dynamic pricing, in which companies adjust prices according 
to changes in demand and supply, etc., is an efficient operation of the price mechanism and does not imply any 
discrimination against consumers. Personalized pricing is based on digitization and mass collection and analysis of 
personal data, and prices are tailored to the consumer (Gleixner,2020). As a result, there is a significant difference in 
legal regulation between dynamic pricing, which tends to receive little attention, and personalized pricing, which is 
highly controversial. 
3. Influencing Factors, Economic Effects and Barriers to Implementation of Dynamic and Personalized Pricing 
3.1 Factors Influencing Dynamic and Personalized Pricing 
Companies in the digital economy are facing increasingly new challenges in terms of pricing strategies. Prices for 
products or services often cannot be set statically, but must be dynamically adjusted over time to suit current conditions. 
Whereas in the past, companies could set prices by adding a percentage of profit to cost (cost-plus pricing), today they 
must set prices based on the strategies of their direct competitors (market-oriented pricing) and, in particular, on the 
demand side (value-based pricing). The ability of a company to adapt its prices to changing circumstances in a very 
short period of time is also seen as a key success factor (Gnsch et al., 2009). 
The main factors affecting dynamic pricing are demand, supply, product and competition. Price sensitivity changes and 
demand shocks (i.e., changes in demand) are key economic factors that affect dynamic price adjustments, such as 
gradual price increases for air conditioners due to the arrival of summer and price spikes for masks due to sudden 
outbreaks of epidemics. Changes in supply factors such as inventory changes, end of sales period, and changes in 
procurement or manufacturing costs can affect prices, such as lower product prices due to increased inventory. Product 
characteristics also affect dynamic pricing, especially the shelf life of perishable products and technological innovation, 
such as the implementation of the national six standards and lead to a significant reduction in the price of national five 
vehicles. Competitive factors, such as competitors' prices, are important factors affecting dynamic price adjustments 
(Spann & Skiera, 2020). 
The factors that influence price setting in personalized pricing are mainly the market position of the company and the 
different willingness to pay of consumers. First, the firm must have a certain degree of market power. Traditional 
economic theory suggests that if there are multiple firms selling the same product in a competitive market, no firm can 
sell any quantity at the market price, and no firm is willing to ask any consumer for a lower price, and if a competing 
firm tries to ask for a higher price, the consumer will switch to another firm's product (Gregory,2012).Second, 
consumers must have different willingness to pay. Consumers' willingness to pay is usually not directly observable and 
other variables must be used as indicators of willingness to pay; therefore, sufficient information about consumers is 
needed to distinguish their segments. Specific distinctions can be made by behavioral, psychological, 
socio-demographic and geographic criteria. Behavioral criteria include consumer's purchase history, brand loyalty and 
purchase volume. Psychographic criteria include consumers' lifestyle, attitude toward risk, and expectations of product 
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quality. Socio-demographic information includes gender, age, job, education, income, etc. Geographic criteria include 
province, city, street, etc. (Badmaeva & Hüllmann, 2019) Companies evaluate consumers' willingness to pay to decide 
whether to pursue the customer. 
In dynamic and personalized pricing, companies often use algorithms for pricing in order to improve the speed and 
accuracy of designing and adjusting prices. Pricing algorithms have the advantage of "automatically setting prices to 
maximize profits" by being able to process large amounts of data and react quickly to any changes in market conditions 
(OECD, 2017).In addition to this, pricing algorithms can reduce the cost of complex pricing and frequent price changes 
and improve the quality of pricing decisions (Yu, 2020).Companies can use Internet technology to automatically collect 
competitor price changes in real time and match them to certain merchant prices, or maintain price gaps for certain 
brands and automatically adjust prices as competitor prices change. Companies can also use more sophisticated 
algorithms to identify a number of other independent factors that may have an impact on sales volume, such as the type 
of product display, customer reviews, or different times of day or week. The algorithm can try to determine the 
importance of each of these influencing factors, predict the sales volume at different prices and adjust the prices. 
3.2 Economic Effects of Dynamic and Personalized Pricing 
1) Impact on social welfare 
Dynamic pricing implies more price volatility, which not only increases price competition among firms, but also leads 
to increased demand. Thus, dynamic pricing can increase social welfare. With fixed prices, firms with some market 
power keep prices above marginal costs, thus limiting total output below the socially optimal level. Personalized pricing, 
on the other hand, has the potential to maximize social welfare. As long as firms can adjust prices to consumers' 
willingness to pay and profitably provide goods or services to every consumer willing to pay more than the marginal 
cost of production, they can maximize output and maximize social welfare. At the same time, social welfare may be 
influenced by the competitive environment. Individualized pricing may either promote or inhibit competition. On the 
one hand, because firms can predict consumers' willingness to pay, personalized pricing may lead to more intense 
competition as firms compete with each other for consumers; on the other hand, personalized pricing can help increase 
firms' market power and increase market concentration, which may harm competition and reduce social welfare (Yu & 
Lan, 2021). 
2) Impact on consumer welfare 
Dynamic pricing is generally beneficial to consumers, who have wider access to the product or service. For consumers 
with low willingness to pay, they can choose to purchase when the price is equal to or lower than their willingness to 
pay, whereas in fixed pricing, this group of consumers may be excluded because the price is higher than their 
willingness to pay. For consumers with high willingness to pay, they can choose to make a purchase at a low price in 
order to get more consumer surplus by, for example, searching more deeply or postponing the purchase. 
Personalized pricing may benefit or harm consumers, depending largely on the context in which it occurs. First, 
personalized pricing may result in a surplus shift from consumers with a high willingness to pay to those with a low 
willingness to pay. Consumers with a high willingness to pay are charged higher prices, depriving them of the consumer 
surplus that they might have obtained at a fixed price and putting them in a less favorable position. However, this allows 
firms to profitably offer the same product or service to consumers with low willingness to pay who would otherwise not 
buy. The benefits to the latter may outweigh the losses to the former, or they may be less than the former (OFT, 2013). 
Second, personalized pricing does not always guarantee lower prices for consumers with low willingness to pay. 
Disadvantaged consumers may be discriminated against because of sensitive personal characteristics, or low-income 
consumers may be charged more for services because they are perceived to be more likely to default on their loans, and 
it is possible that firms may simply exclude consumers with low willingness to pay.Again, personalized pricing can 
better provide consumers with customized products or services, but it may also drive companies to lower the quality of 
their products or services. When firms offer different quality products or services at different prices, one possible 
strategy to force consumers with a high willingness to pay to choose a high quality, expensive product or service is to 
reduce the quality of the lower quality offer (Streel et al., 2017).Finally, the impact of personalized pricing on consumer 
welfare may also depend on the competitive conditions of the market. In monopolistic markets, firms may be better able 
to use their knowledge of consumer valuations to charge higher prices. In more competitive markets, personalized 
pricing may lead firms to compete more aggressively for each consumer, which may increase firms' incentives to lower 
prices (OECD, 2018).As in a duopoly market, total consumer surplus and total social welfare will be maximized once 
competition is introduced (Li et al., 2021). 
3) Impact on corporate welfare 
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Compared to fixed prices, dynamic and personalized pricing can, at least in theory, better leverage consumers' 
willingness to pay to increase firm profits, with personalized pricing leading to even higher profits (Spann & Skiera, 
2020).Personalized pricing tends to transfer surplus from the consumer to the firm, and if personalized pricing leads to 
first-degree price discrimination, the producer receives all the surplus and the consumer's welfare is reduced to zero. 
However, competitive pressures can limit the ability of firms to extract surplus from economic transactions. Even if 
firms are able to predict consumers' willingness to pay and offer prices accordingly, consumers are likely to find lower 
prices for similar products or services offered by other firms, rather than paying prices corresponding to their 
willingness to pay, and the behavior of some consumers switching sellers is enough to penalize firms. Monopolies can 
more easily increase profits through individualized pricing, but competing firms do not necessarily benefit from 
individualized pricing (Streel et al., 2017).In a competitive environment, where firms differ in their ability to obtain data 
and identify consumers' willingness to pay, asymmetric outcomes can arise, and firms with more data and better 
algorithms may benefit more than their competitors. 
3.3 Barriers to the Implementation of Dynamic and Personalized Pricing 
1) Consumer's perception of price fairness 
The barrier for companies to implement dynamic and personalized pricing is primarily consumer acceptance of dynamic 
and personalized pricing, which depends primarily on the consumer's perception of price fairness. Price fairness 
perception refers to the buyer's judgment of the fairness of the price set by the seller, i.e. how the consumer perceives the 
price or price change. The dual rights principle suggests that both the seller and the buyer are entitled to a "reasonable" 
profit and price respectively, i.e., the seller is entitled to a fair profit and the buyer is entitled to a fair price (Vaidyanathan 
& Aggarwal, 2003).The more common consumer perception is that prices are the same for everyone and that when one's 
price is not the same as other consumers' prices, it may be perceived as unfair even if the consumer is profiting from it. 
The most important reference points for assessing consumer perceptions of price fairness are the prices paid by other 
buyers and the prices at other times. Haws and Bearden's research suggests that (1) price differences among consumers 
lead to the greatest perceptions of unfairness and the lowest overall satisfaction, and (2) price changes over very short 
periods of time are more unfair than changes over longer periods of time (2006). 
Prices in dynamic pricing are the same for all consumers at the same time, except that prices change over time. Price 
adjustments over a short period of time may reduce consumers' perception of price fairness, but consumers are also 
generally able to recognize that prices can change rapidly due to factors such as supply and demand. Frequent price 
fluctuations in e-commerce platforms are also well known, with reports that the price of a refrigerator in an e-commerce 
platform can vary by as much as $900 between the highest and lowest within a week, and that there are many items that 
will be priced almost one day at a time (Beijing Youth Daily,2018).Frequent fluctuations in prices offline are also 
common, such as finding changes in the price of oil every time you visit a gas station, and daily price changes in 
supermarkets for items such as dairy and meat. Dynamic pricing increases price transparency, and consumers can easily 
compare prices and also take advantage of price fluctuations by returning higher-priced items when the price trend is 
positive and then reordering the item at a lower price. As a result, consumers' perception of price fairness is higher and 
more acceptable in dynamic pricing. However, companies that mislead consumers into spending money by, for example, 
raising prices first and then offering discounts, reduce consumers' perception of price fairness and are considered unfair. 
Personalized pricing tends to make consumers incapable of estimating prices correctly and is usually perceived as unfair. 
There are many factors in personalized pricing that affect consumers' perceptions of price fairness. The higher the 
degree of personalized pricing, the closer to first-degree price discrimination, the lower the consumer's perception of 
price fairness; personalized pricing based on consumer purchase history is more common, such as giving price 
discounts to loyal customers, the consumer's perception of price fairness is higher than personalized pricing based on 
location data alone; the higher the privacy concern, the lower the consumer's perception of price fairness will be 
(Priester et al., 2020).In addition, the specific implementation of personalized pricing can also highly influence 
consumers' perception of price fairness, e.g., by giving personalized discounts (e.g., by giving personalized coupons), 
by involving consumers in the price formation process (e.g., through online auctions), and by combining it with 
second-degree price discrimination (e.g., through customized products) will enhance consumers' perception of price 
fairness.By improving consumers' perception of price fairness, the acceptance of personalized pricing can be increased. 
2) Goodwill of the enterprise 
Another core issue that prevents companies from implementing dynamic and personalized pricing is consumer reaction in 
the context of perceived price fairness, which can be damaging to a company's image, or at least the risk of being exposed. 
From an economic perspective, companies can use dynamic and personalized pricing to make more profit, but consumers 
may perceive this behavior as unfair. Companies fear this phenomenon for fear of consumer retaliation and damage to 
their goodwill, a cost that can be costly for companies. Consumers' perception of price fairness is key to the sustainability 
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of dynamic and personalized pricing, which should allow consumers to benefit from the price they pay, and if they 
perceive the price to be unfair, the probability of purchase decreases (Richards et al., 2016).This also explains why in 
industries such as supermarkets and restaurants, companies do not implement dynamic pricing even though there is a 
significant increase in consumers; in platforms such as e-commerce, companies still do not implement personalized 
pricing on a large scale even though it is technically perfectly possible to do so, and only focus on a few industries such as 
travel (flights, hotels, etc.) and taxi. 
4. Legal Regulation of Dynamic and Personalized Pricing 
4.1 Regulation by the Personal Information Protection Act 
1) Processing of personal data 
The use of personal data for pricing is a sensitive issue that raises privacy and data security concerns for consumers. 
Dynamic pricing does not require the use of personal data for price optimization and is not a critical issue in terms of 
personal information protection. Personalized pricing, on the other hand, requires the use of personal data and does not 
fall under the exceptions such as necessary for the conclusion or performance of a contract, and therefore requires the 
consent of the individual consumer pursuant to Article 1035, paragraph 1, of the Civil Code and Article 13 of the 
Personal Information Protection Act. 
However, the above provisions do not constitute an absolute restriction on personalized pricing. First, data protection 
laws such as the Civil Code and the Personal Information Protection Act apply only to personal data, and companies 
using anonymous data or other non-personal data for personalized pricing are not required to comply. The purpose of 
personalization is usually not to reveal the identity of individuals, and the focus is not necessarily on the desire to 
collect sensitive personal information or to know whose data is being collected, but on the desire to obtain information 
about the interests and behavioral characteristics of consumers that will enable them to segment consumers in order to 
provide more accurate personalized offers to different groups of consumers.Big data applications and the use of 
algorithms make it possible to process large amounts of data and to link different data to assess and predict consumers' 
willingness to pay. The processing of anonymous data may not make much sense for companies, as information about 
pricing is already processed, but by combining large amounts of data, such as location, browser used, operating system, 
etc., it is possible to eventually establish a reference to the individual consumer (Tillmann & Vogt, 2018).Second, the 
distinction between non-personal and personal data is not very clear, and data that is not classified as personal can still 
be used to identify individual consumers. For example, consumers are segmented through data such as browser and 
operating system. Finally, even if companies comply with the consumer consent principle, it does not mean anything to 
consumers. Consumers have no way of knowing what happens to their data and in what form it is used, and even 
businesses may sometimes be unaware of what happens to the data they collect (Zander-Hayat et al., 2016).Consumers 
are usually informed about personalization and data collection through privacy statements, but few bother to read or 
really understand them. 
2) Automated decision making 
Another issue of concern is automated decision-making using personal data. Article 22 of the EU General Data 
Protection Regulation provides that data subjects all have the right not to accept decisions with legal or similarly serious 
implications for them that are based exclusively on automated processing, including user profiling. The purpose is to 
protect the human dignity and fundamental rights of data subjects, i.e., that only humans can make decisions with legal 
effect and that the exercise of fundamental rights should not be subject to algorithmic decision-making (Peter, 2019). 
Article 24 of China's Personal Information Protection Law also regulates the use of personal data for automated 
decision making. Personalized pricing is usually implemented through automated decision-making and falls within the 
scope of regulation of this article. In terms of content, personalized pricing is, in principle, unobjectionable. Paragraph 1 
of this article stipulates that companies should ensure transparency and fair and just results in personalized pricing, and 
should not apply "unreasonable differential treatment", such as when the price of goods or services differs significantly 
from the market price. Paragraph 2 stipulates that companies should provide non-personalized options or convenient 
refusal methods in commercial marketing and information pushing, which in turn indicates that companies can offer 
personalized prices to consumers. However, according to Article 437 of the Civil Code, price signs in online or offline 
stores are invitations to offer to consumers, which generally do not have a significant impact on consumers' rights and 
interests, and consumers do not have the right to refuse personalized pricing. 
4.2 Regulation of the Anti-monopoly Law 
1) Monopoly agreement 
Algorithms have become the most frequently discussed antitrust topic in the digital economy. Not only can algorithms 
be used to enforce any anticompetitive behavior observable in traditional markets, they may also facilitate the formation 
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of new synergistic behaviors that have not been observed before, and may not even have occurred before, known as 
"algorithmic conspiracy. "Complicity" usually refers to any form of agreement or cooperation between competing firms 
with the goal of increasing profits to a higher level.While economics studies conspiracy as an outcome of the market, 
law focuses on the means implemented by competing firms to achieve a conspiratorial outcome. Algorithmic conspiracy 
by competing firms can achieve the result of excluding and restricting competition by offering the same price to the 
same consumers, leaving them with no choice. Therefore, prohibiting monopolistic agreements between competing 
firms through algorithms is the focus of the Antitrust Law's regulation of dynamic and individualized pricing. 
Article 13(1) of the Anti-Monopoly Law enumerates the scope of monopoly agreements between operators, and 
paragraph 2 provides for the principle of monopoly agreements. A monopoly agreement is an agreement, decision or 
other concerted act to exclude or restrict competition. For agreements or decisions, Article 5, paragraph 2 of the Interim 
Provisions on Prohibition of Monopoly Agreements (hereinafter referred to as the Interim Provisions) issued by the 
State Administration of Market Supervision and Administration in 2019 specifies that they can be in written, oral and 
other forms. Agreements or decisions in the form of written, oral, etc. can be made between competing enterprises to 
implement common algorithms. Algorithms make conspiracies between competing enterprises more insidious, and 
conspiracies can occur between competing enterprises without any communication or contact, or even through machine 
autonomous learning algorithms without any human intervention. Thus, more prevalent in the digital economy are 
implied conspiracies, i.e., other concerted acts, between conspirators without an explicit agreement or decision. 
Article 5(3) of the Provisional Regulation defines other concerted acts, which are acts in which there is substantial 
coordination between the operators although no explicit agreement or decision has been made. article 5 of the 
Anti-monopoly Committee of the State Council's Anti-monopoly Guidelines on the Platform Economy (hereinafter 
referred to as the Platform Anti-monopoly Guidelines) issued in 2021 will "Parallel acts such as price following made 
by the operators concerned based on their independent intention" are explicitly excluded from other concerted acts. 
Parallel acts do not fall under the scope of antitrust law and may be the normal result of rational economic behavior of 
each competing enterprise in the market. If firms unilaterally monitor competitors' prices and raise them at the same 
time, or if many firms use individualized pricing at the same time, and as their algorithms become more and more 
similar, there will be identical prices - after all, there is only one price that corresponds to the consumer's willingness to 
pay. There is an ambiguity between illegal other concerted acts and legal parallel acts, and Article 6 of the Provisional 
Regulation sets out the factors that should be taken into account when determining other concerted acts, with 
subparagraph (b) explicitly considering whether there has been meaningful contact or information exchange between 
operators. In order to regulate monopoly agreements through third parties, Article 8 of China's Platform Antitrust 
Guidelines provides for in-platform operators to resort to hub-and-spoke agreements with platform operators. Therefore, 
if there are behaviors such as sharing pricing algorithms or joint use of third-party pricing algorithms among competing 
enterprises, other synergistic behaviors may be considered to exist even if there is no direct intentional contact or 
information exchange. It is unclear whether and how conspiracy formed through self-learning algorithms falls within 
the scope of regulation under antitrust law. 
2) Abuse of dominant market position 
Article 17(6) of the Antimonopoly Law prohibits an operator with a dominant market position from abusing its 
dominant market position and applying differential treatment to the counterparties of transactions under the same 
conditions without a positive reason. Article 17 of the Platform Antimonopoly Guidelines further clarifies the 
differential treatment of operators in the platform economy. Differences in price are differential treatment, and therefore, 
personalized pricing based on the payment ability, consumption preference, and usage habits of transaction 
counterparties fall within the scope of regulation of this article. 
It is not illegal for an enterprise to have a dominant position in the market, but what the antitrust law regulates is the 
abuse of the dominant position by the enterprise. Personalized pricing constitutes a prohibition of differential treatment 
under this article if the following four elements are met: (1) the operator has a dominant market position in the relevant 
market; (2) the operator applies differential treatment in price to the counterparty under the same conditions; (3) the 
operator's conduct excludes or restricts competition; and (4) the operator has no justifiable reasons for the conduct. An 
operator with a dominant market position in the relevant market is a prerequisite for antitrust regulation, and an operator 
without a dominant market position does not fall within the scope of regulation under this article even if it implements 
personalized pricing. Personalized pricing is implemented directly to consumers or consumer groups, but antitrust laws 
usually do not consider the impact of personalized pricing on individual consumers, but rather focus on the impact on 
the entire consumer group or even the entire market (Zhou, 2021).Personalized pricing may promote competition or 
exclude or restrict competition, but requires a comprehensive judgment based on its effects, but it should be clear that 
obstruction and unequal treatment of other participants in the market is also a component of competition. For justifiable 
reasons, Article 17(3) of the Platform Antitrust Guidelines provides in general terms that an enterprise's conduct based 
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on the actual needs of the counterparty to the transaction and in accordance with proper trading habits and industry 
practices, preferential activities for new users within a reasonable period of time, random transactions and other reasons 
that can justify the conduct are all justifiable reasons. Therefore, from the perspective of antitrust law, personalized 
pricing is in principle unobjectionable as long as companies with corresponding market power do not abuse their 
dominant market position. 
4.3 Price Law and Other Laws and Regulations to Regulate 
1) Price fraud 
Article 13(d) of the Price Law provides for price fraud as a price violation. The following three elements must be met to 
constitute price fraud: (1) the enterprise commits a false or misleading act of price tactics; (2) the consumer is caught in 
a misunderstanding; and (3) the consumer enters into a transaction with the enterprise as a result of the 
misunderstanding. Dynamic and personalized pricing are not arbitrary price adjustments. Dynamic pricing is based on a 
response to changing market conditions, and personalized pricing is a price tailored to the consumer's willingness to pay, 
and based on pricing freedom and trade secrets, companies are not required to disclose to consumers how prices are 
calculated. Therefore, in general, dynamic and personalized pricing does not meet the elements of price fraud. However, 
price fraud can also exist in dynamic and personalized pricing, such as companies offering highly differentiated prices 
to offline and online customers in order to hide the true price by advertising promotions with false discounts。 
2) Price discrimination 
Article 13(v) of the Price Law provides for price discrimination as a price violation. This subparagraph provides for a 
price discrimination violation between operators, the purpose of which is to prohibit unfair treatment of operators with 
the same trading conditions, especially the exclusion of some smaller operators. Personalized pricing is price 
discrimination, but it is aimed at consumers, not other operators. Therefore, personalized pricing is not the scope of the 
regulation. 
It should be noted that Article 69 of the Data Regulations of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone prohibits market players 
from using data analysis to impose differential treatment on counterparties with the same trading conditions. This article 
refers to Article 17 of the Platform Antimonopoly Guidelines, but expands its scope of application. The scope of 
application of Article 17 of the Platform Antitrust Guidelines is strictly limited, and the complicated procedure for 
determining whether personalized pricing is an abuse of a dominant market position makes it difficult to impose timely 
penalties for price violations. Article 69 of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Data Regulations, which does not 
presuppose that an enterprise has a dominant market position, can well regulate price violations, but the provisions of 
this article are too harsh and fail to fully consider the beneficial effects of personalized pricing on consumer welfare and 
total social welfare, and strictly limit personalized pricing to specific excluded circumstances with the legal effect of 
fixed prices. Therefore, the future will have to face the problem of how to limit the scope of application of the article. 
3) Misleading by omission 
When choosing between different offers, price is a central factor in a consumer's decision to purchase. Most consumers 
will assume that they are paying the same price as others for the same product at the same point in time, and do not 
recognize that prices are individualized. Article 20(3) of the Law on the Protection of Consumer Rights and Interests 
and the Regulations on the Implementation of Clear Price Indication for Goods and Services only provide that 
businesses have the obligation to indicate prices clearly, and Article 18(1) of the E-Commerce Law and Article 24(2) of 
the Law on the Protection of Personal Information only provide that businesses should provide options that are not 
specific to their personal characteristics. However, Chinese law is silent on whether an enterprise's failure to inform 
consumers that prices are personalized on the basis of automated decision making constitutes price misrepresentation. 
German law tends to regulate personalized pricing through the Unlauterer Wettbewerb-Gesetz (UWG), which, 
according to Section 5a(2) of the UWG, constitutes an omission of misleading information if the enterprise conceals 
important information on the basis of which the consumer makes an informed transactional decision and the 
concealment of this information is likely to lead the consumer to make a transactional decision that he would not 
otherwise have made. Whether personalized pricing information is material information for the purposes of this article 
was previously unclear and has become very clear with the enactment of EU Directive 2019/2161 (Gleixner, 
2020).Article 45 of EU Directive 2019/2161 states that providing for personalized pricing is permissible per se, but only 
imposes an obligation on companies to provide information when personalizing pricing so that consumers can take into 
account the possible risks when making purchasing decisions.In addition, Germany has incorporated the content of this 
directive into the scope of the obligation to provide information in consumer contracts through Section 312d(1) of the 
German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB), which provides contractual protection for consumers. 
Information provision obligations do not necessarily provide very effective protection for consumers, especially as 
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personalized pricing becomes more common in the future, but they can at least make consumers aware of the fact that 
personalized pricing is available so that they are aware of the possible risks when making their decisions. 
5. Conclusion 
In the future digital economy, dynamic and personalized pricing will be further developed, which also brings challenges 
in terms of personal information protection, market competition maintenance and consumer rights protection. Dynamic 
pricing and personalized pricing are different in meaning and should be distinguished from each other in terms of legal 
regulation. Dynamic pricing does not involve the processing of personal data and is not a key issue in terms of personal 
information protection. Personalized pricing involves the use of personal data for pricing purposes, and the consent of 
the individual consumer should be obtained in accordance with the provisions of the Personal Information Protection 
Law, and the implementation of automated decision-making should also ensure transparency and fair and equitable 
results without unreasonable differential treatment. Conspiracy through algorithms in dynamic and personalized pricing 
is the focus of regulation under the Antitrust Law. The use of algorithms makes conspiracies between competing firms 
more concealed and easier to maintain, and the ambiguity between illegal concerted behavior and legal parallel behavior, 
especially conspiracies formed through self-learning algorithms, poses a challenge to the determination of monopoly 
agreements. Another focus of the Antimonopoly Law regulation is the abuse of a dominant market position by an 
enterprise to impose differential treatment on counterparties to transactions under the same conditions. The key to the 
issue is to determine whether the enterprise has a dominant market position and whether the pricing behavior has the 
effect of restricting or excluding competition. Digitalization has intensified the information asymmetry between 
enterprises and consumers, making consumers' rights and interests more vulnerable to damage. The Price Law and other 
laws mainly regulate price violations in terms of promoting fair trade and protecting consumers' rights and interests. 
Generally speaking, dynamic and personalized pricing does not constitute price fraud, and price discrimination is 
limited to between operators; price fraud and price discrimination do not constitute barriers to dynamic and 
personalized pricing. It is advisable for legislators to exercise restraint with regard to personalized pricing, not to ban it 
completely because of its possible misconduct, and to carefully weigh the impact on social welfare, consumer welfare 
and corporate welfare before considering further legal measures to protect the freedom of enterprises to set prices and 
not to easily deprive consumers of the advantages brought by personalized pricing. In this regard, it is possible to 
conduct a study that draws on the practices of the European Union and Germany to reinforce the obligation of 
companies to provide information in the case of personalized pricing. 
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